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The potential benefits of integrating helminth control programmes 
into existing HIV and TB services warrant consideration. Such efforts 
should be supported by operational research to evaluate the impact 
of helminth control on HIV/AIDS and TB disease progression. 
Epidemiological and immunological research is also essential to 
understand the complexities of immunity during co-infections with 
helminths, HIV and TB.
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Palliative care:  
Definition of euthanasia
To the Editor: Euthanasia is defined as ‘conduct that brings about 
an easy and painless death for persons suffering from an incurable 
or painful disease or condition’.[1] Active euthanasia is the intentional 
killing of a person suffering from an incurable disease, and fulfils the 
legal criteria for murder. There is intent, causation, a human is the 
victim, and the act, whether by omission or commission, is unlawful. 
Motive, albeit the altruistic desire to relieve unnecessary suffering 
in the face of futility, is irrelevant to criminal intent.[2] The term 
passive euthanasia includes withholding extreme medical measures 
or removing life support in the presence of futile or non-beneficial 
treatment. McQuoid-Mason[2] outlines the reason why, in the eyes of 
the law, passive euthanasia is not a criminal offence, and withholding 
or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment or administering sufficient 
analgesia and sedation during the latter cannot be construed as 
murder. Of the four legal prerequisites for the definition of murder, 
namely intent, causation, a human victim and contravention of the 
law, only the last-mentioned is not fulfilled and spares the doctor 
from a conviction. Although reassuring to those working in critical 
care, where withholding or withdrawing support is a fact of life (or 
death), the fact that only one component of the legal definition spares 
us from being labelled criminals is somewhat disconcerting. We would 
argue that in addition to the lack of unlawfulness, neither intent nor 
causation applies, and furthermore that the term ‘passive euthanasia’ is 
an oxymoron and should be abandoned.
In the situation of withholding or withdrawing treatment, which 
hastens death, the legal concept of eventual intent applies whereby 
the perpetrator does not mean to kill the person but does foresee 
death as a consequence.[2] We contend that death arises directly as 
a consequence of the underlying disease process and the inability 
of the patient to maintain homeostasis, and indirectly as the result 
of withdrawal of support. In fact McQuoid-Mason[1] defines passive 
euthanasia as ‘aiming at preventing the prolonging of death by 
allowing an irreversible fatal underlying illness to kill the patient 
through withholding or withdrawing treatment’, implying thereby 
that the disease and not the actions of the doctor causes death. 
There is a major difference between intentional killing, albeit out of 
altruism, and allowing death to occur as a direct consequence of the 
inciting disease or injury in the presence of non-beneficial treatment.
The same argument pertains to causation, where legally the 
underlying disease is not considered as a new intervening cause and 
the cause of death is regarded as the final event, such as withholding 
or withdrawing therapy. According to McQuoid-Mason’s definition 
of passive euthanasia, it is the underlying illness that is responsible 
for death. Furthermore, part 1 of paragraph 77 in Section G1 of the 
Notice of Death/Still Birth clearly specifies that the immediate cause of 
death must be documented as the final disease or condition resulting 
in death. This is in direct conflict with legal causation if treatment 
has been withheld or withdrawn. Must we therefore complete the 
immediate cause of death as withdrawal of therapy and conditions 
leading to the immediate cause as non-beneficial treatment?
That the legal stance of causation is contentious is illustrated by 
the following not uncommon scenario in South Africa. Consider 
two patients with traumatic brain injury and a large extradural 
haematoma, one in a remote rural area and the other with immediate 
access to a neurosurgical unit. The former dies before transfer to 
definitive care, and the latter after a craniotomy and evacuation 
but when further treatment is deemed non-beneficial and support 
is therefore withdrawn. Both die as a direct consequence of their 
injury. Why therefore is the act of withdrawal regarded as causation, 
thereby changing the entire legal perspective?
Murder cannot be defined in active or passive terms and, if 
synonymous by definition, neither can euthanasia. The term passive 
euthanasia is paradoxical, serves only to confuse, and should be 
abandoned. In the presence of futility, withholding or withdrawing 
therapy and administering sufficient doses of analgesia and sedation 
to ensure comfort is humane and acceptable practice.[3] We propose 
that there should be only a single definition of euthanasia, namely an 
act of omission or commission remote from the normal standard of 
care with the specific intent of causing death.
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Prof. McQuoid-Mason responds: I can understand the somewhat 
emotional response to my article, illustrated by the sentence ‘that 
only one component of the legal definition spares us from being 
labelled criminals’. The real reason doctors are not held legally liable 
for murder when they withdraw or withhold treatment in futile cases, 
or hasten death through the prescription of certain drugs, is because 
their conduct is not unlawful – not because they do not intend the 
patient to die or did not cause the death of the patient.
As I said in my article,[1] all four elements for murder (the element 
referring to a human being is not usually in dispute) have to be 
satisfied – if the unlawfulness element is missing, there is no crime.
This is not unusual for other areas of medical practice. For instance, 
cutting a person open during an operation is a serious assault (the 
surgeon causes injury to the patient’s body), but it is not unlawful 
if the patient consented to the procedure, or it if it is an emergency 
situation where the patient is unable to give consent.
Muckart et al.’s contention that ‘in addition to the lack of 
unlawfulness, neither intent nor causation applies’ does not hold 
in terms of the law. Surely a doctor who orders that life support 
treatment is withheld or withdrawn, or prescribes a drug that lessens 
a person’s life expectancy, knows that their omission or conduct 
will hasten the patient’s death? Legally this knowledge amounts to 
eventual intention. Likewise, death will follow either immediately or 
later, the underlying illness or injury taking over, and the conduct 
of the doctor contributes to the death of the patient by allowing 
such condition to take over. This satisfies the legal requirement of 
causation for the reasons set out in the article.
The suggestion that there ‘is a major difference between intentional 
killing, albeit out of altruism, and allowing death to occur as a direct 
consequence of the inciting disease or injury in the presence of non-
beneficial treatment’ is recognised by the law, which states that such 
conduct is not unlawful – even though the other elements of murder 
may be present.
The concern about part 1 of paragraph 77 in Section G of the Notice 
of Death/Still Birth could be met by adopting what was quoted from 
Mason and McCall Smith at the end of my article: ‘Lawful withdrawal 
of life support systems which were necessitated by [the disease]’.[2] This 
would be the technically accurate manner of recording the death – with 
suitable adjustments for the nature of the injury or illness. However, it 
may be that the current practice is acceptable to the Registrar of Births 
and Deaths and the other relevant authorities.
The example of the two cases of patients with traumatic brain injury 
and a large extradural haematoma ‘compares apples with oranges’. The 
death of the patient in the remote rural area ‘before transfer to definitive 
care’ may be directly due to the injuries without any intervention by 
healthcare professionals, unless the death was due to some negligent act 
or omission by them, so the latter did not cause the death. In the case 
of the patient who is given ‘immediate access to a neurosurgical unit’, 
the healthcare professionals concerned have placed the patient on life 
support to keep him/her alive. When they withdraw the support they 
hasten the death of the patient because further treatment is futile, but 
their conduct is not unlawful. The ‘legal perspective’ does not change, 
because in both situations the death may be lawful.
I agree that ‘passive euthanasia’ is an oxymoron, for the reasons set 
out in the article, but it is a widely used term for lawful euthanasia. 
The definition of euthanasia suggested by Muckart et al. fails to deal 
with the question of causation and the objectives aimed at ending 
pain or suffering. However, there is some merit in adopting an 
amended version of the current definition of ‘active euthanasia’ as a 
definition of ‘euthanasia’ proper, without subdividing it into ‘active’ 
and ‘passive’. Thus, the definition could read: ‘Euthanasia occurs where 
a person with the actual intention to kill unlawfully causes the death 
of a terminally ill patient to end pain or suffering.’ This definition 
is consistent with that of murder, in that it includes intention, 
unlawfulness and causation, but is modified to include the elements of 
‘actual intention’, which excludes ‘eventual intention’, and the objective 
‘to end pain and suffering’ that is associated with euthanasia.
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Palliative care:  
Preventing misconceptions
To the Editor: McQuoid-Mason’s statement that ‘Doctors who 
hasten the termination of the lives of their patients by withholding 
or withdrawing treatment or prescribing a potentially fatal palliative 
dose of medication satisfy the elements of intention and causation 
of a charge of murder against them’[1] is of great concern. It 
highlights a disconnect between the professions of law and medicine 
and misconceptions regarding the practice of palliative care. Such 
statements influence professional and public perceptions and create 
barriers to patient and family access to quality end-of-life care that 
focuses on relief of suffering and improving quality of life.
The World Health Organization definition of palliative care 
includes affirming life, regards dying as a normal process, and intends 
neither to hasten nor postpone death. The palliative care approach 
aims to improve quality of life and assist patients to live as actively as 
possible. It may aim to prolong life where there is expectation of fair 
quality of life, but not to prolong dying. Clinical skill and experience 
assist the doctor and the palliative care team in identifying where 
quality of life can be improved and when patients are dying without 
likelihood of improvement.
Excluding those who die suddenly, many people are under medical 
care when they die. Doctors do not cause the death, which results from 
the disease process. When treatment is futile, is refused or has no benefit, 
it should not be given just because treatment is available. ‘Consideration 
of withholding or withdrawing treatment as a sound clinical decision 
developed as a consequence of the availability of advanced medical 
technology and the resultant ability to prolong life that in some cases is 
in fact unwanted prolongation of the dying process.’[2]
